Therefore,
the recent proposal of the EC to introduce screening measures has more to do
with political economy, wider geopolitical or even security reasons. For
instance, one of the biggest concerns is that some of the recent FDI coming into
the EU is from various emerging economies such as China, Kazakhstan and Russia,
which still have many State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in their economies.
This
according to economists is a problem, but a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation tells me that the share of this FDI in some sensitive sectors
flowing from these countries with much SEOs involved is at most 3.5 percent of
EU’s total incoming FDI. Hence, a first question appears: does that warrant an
overall screening measure? Some trade-offs are involved as obviously economics doesn’t
stand on its own here.
However, my
intervention was about the future of foreign investments. In particular, the
changing nature of investments the EU has received in recent years, namely
investments in digital sectors. This should force policy makers to think about
when proposing investment regulations, including screening.
First,
although it is right to state that FDI brings along a great “footprint” as
economist say, this is in fact much lower for digital investments. With
“footprint” we mean economic activity such as employment, value-added and
greater output. Footprints for tangible investments such as manufacturing are known
to be high, but the recent UNCTAD (2017) report shows that this footprint from
multinational digital companies is actually much lower.
This can be
seen in the figure below that measures this footprint by taking the ratio from
foreign sales over foreign assets. For manufacturing and telecoms this ratio is
actually 1:1 (in case of telecoms the assets are high because of infrastructure
investments). Yet for FDI coming from digital multinationals, foreign assets
are typically lower leading to a much higher ratio (because of higher sales),
which means a lower footprint.
Source: UNCTAD WIR (2017)




